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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
JURISDICTION: Zoning Powers
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989), Brendale, a part-Indian
non-tribal member owned land in the "closed" or restricted area
of the Yakima Reservation through inheritance. The land in this
area of the reservation was for many years inalienable to nonIndians, and it was comprised almost exclusively of trust lands.
Wilkerson, a non-Indian, owned land in a "checkerboard" area
of the reservation which was not restricted to Indian ownership.
About half the land in the "open" area was fee land and the
other half was comprised of trust lands.
The Court addressed whether the Yakima Indian Nation has
the authority to zone land owned by non-Indians in the "closed"
and "checkerboard" areas of their reservation. The Court held
the Yakima Indian Nation retained the authority to zone lands
owned by non-Indians in the "closed" area of their reservation
(Brendale) but not in "checkerboard" area (Wilkinson).
There was no majority opinion. Three opinions were written
by the Court. Four justices (White, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy) were of the opinion that the Yakima Indian Nation
did not retain any authority to zone non-Indian lands within their
reservation; while three justices (Blackmun, joined by Brennan
and Marshall) were of the opinion that the Yakima Indian Nation
retained the authority to zone virtually all reservation lands regardless of whether the land is presently owned by non Indians.
The dispositive opinion was written by Justice White, joined
by Justice O'Connor. White opined that the Yakima Indian
Nation possessed the power to zone non-Indian land where the
tribe has the ability to define the "fundamental character" of
the land as Indian lands. This is possible where fee land, owned
by non-tribal members is small in relation to the total area in
question. On the other hand, where the "fundamental character"
of the land can not be defed because of extensive non-Indian
fee ownership (the "checkerboard" area of the reservation), the
Yakima Indian Nation lacks the power to zone the non-Indian
portions.
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The importance of Brendale is that it reveals not only how the
Court views the Yakima Indian Nation's right to zone non-Indian
reservation lands, but also that the present Court is likely to take
a more constrictive view on Indian sovereignty in the future. It
seems strange that the Court is taking a more constrictive view
on Indian sovereignty issues when the Indian sovereignty pendulum appears to be swinging in the opposite direction in both
the executive and legislative branches of our Federal government.
JURISDICTION: Taxation
In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698
(1989), the Court upheld the finding of the New Mexico Court
of Appeals that the state may validly impose severance taxes on
the same on-reservation production of oil and gas by non-Indian
lessees as is subject to the Tribe's own severance tax.
Pursuant to authority granted by the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 (1938 Act)', the Jicarilla Apache Tribe (the Tribe)
leased lands on its New Mexico reservation to appellant Cotton
Petroleum Corp. (Cotton), a non-Indian company, for the production of oil and gas. Cotton's on-reservation production is
subject to both a 6 percent tribal severance tax and appellee
state's 8 percent severance taxes, which applies to all producers
throughout the state. Cotton brought an action in New Mexico
state district court under the commerce clause of 'the federal
Constitution, contending that the state taxes were invalid because
the amount of state severance tax imposed by New Mexico on
reservation activity far exceeded the value of services that the
state provided in relation to such activity. The Tribe filed a brief
amicus curiae arguing that a decision upholding the state taxes
would substantially interfere with the tribe's ability to raise its
own tax rates and would diminish the desirability of on-reservation leases.
The Court invited the parties to brief and argue, in addition
to the issues enumerated above, whether the commerce clause
requires a tribe to be treated as a "state" for purposes of
determining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted
on a reservation must be apportioned to account for taxes the
tribe imposed on the same activity.
The Court's reasoning on each issue was as follows;
(1) Under the Supreme Court's modern decisions, on-reservation oil and gas production by non-Indian lessees is subject to
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1982).
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nondiscriminatory state taxation unless Congress has expressly or
impliedly acted to preempt the state taxes.
(2) The state taxes in question are not preempted by federal
law, even when it is given the most generous construction under
the relevant preemption test, which is flexible and sensitive to the
particular facts and legislation involved and requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests, including tribal sovereignty and independence.
The 1938 Act neither expressly permits nor precludes state
taxation, but simply authorizes the leasing for mining purposes
of Indian lands.
Moreover, the Act's legislative history sheds little light on
congressional intent. The statement therein that the preexisting
law was inadequate to give Indians the greatest return for their
property does not embody a broad congressional policy of maximizing tribes' revenues without regard to competing state interests, but simply suggests that Congress sought to remove
disadvantages in mineral leasing on Indian lands that were not
present with respect to public land, which were, at the time,
subject to state taxation.
The fact that the 1938 Act's statutory predecessor expressly
waived immunity from state taxation of oil and gas lessees on
reservations demonstrates that there is no history of tribal independence from such taxation, while the 1938 Act's omission of
that waiver simply reflects congressional recognition that the
Supreme Court's intervening decisions had repudiated the preexisting doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, under which
such state taxation was barred absent express congressional authorization.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker2 , and Ramah Navajo
School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico3 , are
distinguished on the ground that, here, the state provides substantial services to the tribe and Cotton that justify the tax; the
tax imposes no economic burden on the tribe; and federal and
tribal regulation is not exclusive, since the state regulates the
spacing and mechanical integrity of on-reservation wells.
(3) There is no merit to Cotton's contention that the state's
severance taxes-insofar as they are imposed without allocation
or apportionment on top of tribal taxes-impose an unlawful
multiple tax burden on interstate commerce. The fact that the
state and tribe tax the same activity is not dispositive, since each
2. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
3. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
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of those entities has taxing jurisdiction over the non-Indian wells
by virtue of the taxation of Cotton's leases entirely on reservation
lands within a single state.
The fact that the total tax burden on Cotton is greater than
the burden on off-reservation producers is also not determinative,
since neither taxing jurisdiction's tax is discriminatory, and the
burdensome consequences are entirely attributable to the fact of
concurrent jurisdiction.
The argument that the state taxes generate revenues that far
exceed the value of the state's on-reservation services is also
rejected. Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that
benefits received from a taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer-or by those living in the taxpayer's community-must equal the amount of its tax obligations.
(4) The express language, distinct applications, and judicial
interpretation of the interstate commerce and Indian commerce
clauses establish that Indian tribes may not be treated as "states"
for tax apportionment purposes.
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
In Mississippi Bank of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S.
Ct. 1597 (1989), the Court held that the domicile of Indian
children for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act' (ICWA)
is the same as the domicile of the parents and that the state court
was, therefore, without jurisdiction in this matter.
The cases involved the status of twin illegitimate babies, whose
parents were enrolled members of appellant tribe and residents
and domiciliaries of its reservation, in Neshoba County, Mississippi. After the twins' births in Harrison County, some 200 miles
from the reservation, and their parents' execution of consent-toadoption forms, they were adopted in that county's chancery
court by the appellees Holyfield, who were non-Indian.
The chancery court subsequently overruled appellant tribe's
motion to vacate the adoption decree, which was based on the
assertion that the ICWA vested exclusive jurisdiction in appellant's tribal court. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed,
holding that the twins were not "domiciled" on the reservation
under state law, in light of the chancery court's findings (1) that
they had never been physically present there, and (2) that they
were "voluntarily surrendered" by their parents, who went to
some efforts to see that they were born outside the reservation
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (1982).
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and promptly arranged for their adoption. Therefore, the court
said, the twins' domicile was in Harrison County, and the chancery court properly exercised jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings.
The Court addressed the definition of the word "domiciled"
as it is used in the ICWA and at the time at which domicile is
determined.
The Court reasoned that although the ICWA does not define
"domicile," Congress clearly intended a uniform federal law of
domicile for the ICWA and did not consider the definition of
the word to be a matter of state law. The ICWA's purpose was,
in part, to make clear that in certain situations the state courts
did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. In fact,
the statutory congressional findings demonstrate that Congress
perceived the states and their courts as partly responsible for the
child separation problem it intended to correct. Thus, it is most
improbable that Congress would have intended to make the scope
of the statute's key jurisdictional provision subject to definition
by state courts as a matter of state law. Moreover, Congress
could hardly have intended a definition of "domicile," whereby
different rules could apply from time to time to the same Indian
child, simply as a result of being moved across state lines.
The Court found the generally accepted meaning of the term
"domicile" applies under the ICWA, to the extent it is not
inconsistent with the objectives of the statute. In the absence of
a statutory defimition, it is generally assumed that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the word used,
in light of the statute's objective and policy. Well-settled principles
provided that the domicile of minors, who generally are legally
incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish domicile, is
determined by that of their parents, which has traditionally meant
the domicile of the mother in the case of illegitimate children.
Thus, since the domicile of the twins' mother (as well as the
father) has been, at all relevant times, on appellant's reservation,
the twins were domiciled there even though they have never been
there. This result is not altered by the fact that they were "voluntarily surrendered" for adoption. Congress enacted the ICWA
because of concerns going beyond the wishes of the individual
parents, finding that the removal of Indian children from their
cultural setting seriously impacts on long-term tribal survival and
has a damaging social and psychological impact on many individual Indian children. These concerns demonstrate that Congress
could not have intended to enact a rule of domicile that would
permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA's jurisdicPublished by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
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tional scheme simply by giving birth and placing the child for
adoption off the reservation.
In DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th
Cir. 1989), the Eighth Circuit held that the district court has
federal question jurisdiction to determine whether the tribe has
the power to compel a non-Indian to submit to the civil jurisdiction of the tribal court.
In a child custody proceeding involving the orders of two state
courts and the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, at issue is the tribal
court's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction under the ICWA, the
petitioner's right to due process under the Indian Civil Rights
Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. 3 The district
court held that the petitioner had no right to relief under either
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act or the Indian Civil Rights
Act, and that the ICWA is inapplicable to child custody proceedings between divorced parents, and thus is inapplicable to the
petitioner's suit. The district court also held that the tribal court
had no personal jurisdiction over the petitioner, and thus had no
authority to adjudicate the custody dispute involving his children.
The tribal court appeals arguing that the district court erred in
holding that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over the custody
dispute.
In addition to holding that the district court has federal question jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit also affirmed the ruling of
the district court that the petitioner has no direct federal cause
of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and the
ICWA does not apply to the case. The court however disagreed
with the district court's finding that section 1302(8) of the Indian
Civil Rights Act does not give the petitioner a federal cause of
action. While the court finds that the habeas corpus petition is
an appropriate means of securing federal court jurisdiction, the
appeal court reverses the district court's finding that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction over nonmembers absent their consent,
on the grounds that the petitioner failed to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court.
In Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Larch, 872 F.2d 66
(4th Cir. 1989), the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and
Frederick Larch, a member of the tribe, appeal from the district
court's denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking
the return of Larch's two children, enrolled members of the
Cherokee Tribe, who have been removed from the Cherokee
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/7

No. 1]

FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

233

Reservation pursuant to a North Carolina state court's custody
order. The Larches obtained a divorce in North Carolina state
court and the court awarded custody to the mother. Four years
later, the father obtained an order from the Cherokee Indian
Court granting him custody of the two children and he brought
the children from his former wife's residence to live with him on
the Cherokee Reservation. The mother then sought enforcement
of the 1983 state court custody decree. The North Carolina state
court issued an immediate custody order, modifying its 1983
decree by giving immediate sole custody of the children to the
mother. The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds
that (1) it lacked jurisdiction, and (2) the tribe had failed to state
a cause" of action.
The Fourth Circuit finds that the district court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1362 to determine the scope of the
Cherokee Tribal Court's jurisdiction. The appeals court holds
that an Indian tribe is a "state" as defined in Section 1738A(b)(8)
of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.
Section 1738A, and thus that the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians is entitled to the Act's benefits and must comply with
the Act's obligations to honor the custody decree of a state court,
but finds that there is no private cause of action under PKPA
to sustain the court's jurisdiction to choose between competing
custody orders of a state and tribal c6urt, and that the Cherokee
Tribe's reliance on the provisions of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. -Sections 1901-1963, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, as the ICWA does not apply to child custody matters
arising out of a divorce proceeding.
JURISDICTION: Federal Question
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham, 109 S. Ct. 1519
(1989), the Court held that the well-pleaded complaint rule defeated federal court jurisdiction in this matter.
This case involves an attempt by the state of Oklahoma to tax
cigarette sales and bingo revenues of a tribal enterprise of the
Chicaksaw Nation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, which had dismissed
the case on tribal sovereign immunity grounds. The Tenth Circuit
also held that removal to federal court was proper because, even
though the state's complaint facially had raised only state law
questions, the "implicit federal question" of tribal immunity was
involved. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's
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decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
the Supreme Court's discussion of removal of jurisdiction and
the well-pleaded complaint rule in CaterpillarInc. v. Williams,
On remand, the Tenth Circuit again held that removal and dismissal were proper. The U.S. Supreme Court grarited cert a
second time.
The Court held that under Caterpillara,the well-pleaded complaint rule defeats federal question jurisdiction and the case was
improperly removed from the state courts. The Court, therefore,
reversed the Tenth Circuit and expressed no opinion on the issue
of tribal immunity, which it deemed not to be properly before
the federal courts.
TRIBAL COURTS
In Hodel v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989), the court determined that 1936 Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act repealed the
provision at section 28 of the Curtis Act which abolished the
tribal courts of the Creek Nation in Oklahoma, and thereby the
Creek Nation is authorized to establish tribal courts having general
civil criminal jurisdiction over cases involving tribal members.
Although 1936 Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act did not expressly
repeal section 28 of the Curtis Act which abolished tribal courts,
it conferred power upon Indian tribes to adopt constitution, which
may reasonably be read to include power to create courts with
general civil and criminal jurisdiction, and if the OIWA can be
construed in favor of tribe, it must be so construed.

1. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
2. Id.
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A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Set forth below is a bill introduced in the Senate by Senator
Hatch of Utah. If enacted, this bill will severely limit tribal court
jurisdiction:
101st Congress
1st Session
S.517
To provide Federal court authority to enforce rights secured by
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 6 (legislative day, January 3), 1989
MR. HATCH introduced the following bill: which was read twice
and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide Federal court authority to enforce rights secured
by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments
of 1989."
Sec. 2. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Public Law
90-284, 25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.), commonly called the Indian Civil
Rights Act or the Indian Bill of Rights, is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new section:
Sec. 204. (a) Compliance with Section 202. - Federal district
courts shall have jurisdiction of civil rights actions alleging a
failure to comply with rights secured by this Act. Sovereign
immunity shall not constitute a defense to such an action.
b) Any aggrieved individual, following the exhaustion of such
tribal remedies as may be both timely and reasonable under
the circumstances, or the Attorney General on behalf of the
United States, may initiate an action in Federal district court
for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief against an
Indian tribe, tribal organization, or official thereof, alleging a
failure to comply with rights secured by this Act.
(c)In any civil action brought by an aggrieved individual, or
by the Attorney General, the Federal district court shall adopt
the findings of fact of the tribal court, if such findings have
been made, unless the district court determines that
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
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(1) the tribal court was not fully independent from the tribal
legislative or executive authority;
(2) the tribal court was not authorized to or did not finally
determine matters of law and fact;
(3) the tribal court permitted those subject to the Act, on issues
of declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief, to interpose
a defense of immunity;
(4) the tribal court failed to resolve the merits of the factual
dispute;
(5) the tribal court employed a factfinding procedure not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(6) the tribal court did not adequately develop material facts;
(7) the tribal court failed to provide a full, fair, and adequate
hearing; or
(8) the factual determinations of the tribal court are not fairly
supported by the record, in which event the district court shall
conduct a de novo review of the allegations contained in the
complaint.
(d) In any civil action brought under this Act the Federal court
shall, whenever a question of tribal law is at issue, accord due
deference to the interpretation of the tribal court of tribal laws
and customs.
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